The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in Financial Policy: An Application to the Subprime Crisis by Herring, Richard J.
Essay
The Known, the Unknown, and the Unknowable in
Financial Policy: An Application to the Subprime
Crisis
Richard J. Herringt
This Essay examines the subprime crisis through the lenses of the known,
the unknown, and the unknowable in financial policymaking. The first two
Parts focus on information and incentive problems faced by monetary
policymakers and prudential supervisors in trying to prevent crises. The third
Part emphasizes challenges that arise when preventative measures fail and
financial policymakers must manage financial crises. These include pressures
to oversupply public subsidies in the short-run at the risk of providing
incentives for institutions to take greater risks and cause larger crises in the
long run, and conflicts and gaps between micro- and macro-prudential
supervision. Some micro-prudential regulation may make individual
institutions safer, while increasing the vulnerability of the financial system to
systemic risk.
Introduction
This Essay draws upon a project conducted by the Wharton Financial
Institutions Center about the known, the unknown, and the unknowable in
financial risk management. The "known" (K) refers to a situation where we
know the probability of a future event with sufficient certainty that we can
specify all the parameters of the probability distribution with a high degree of
confidence. This may occur because we have extremely powerful a priori
knowledge-for example, a theory of what determines the event about which
nearly all experts agree-or because we have data collected over a sufficient
range of conditions that we can estimate the distribution with a high degree of
confidence.
t Jacob Safra Professor of International Banking, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
1 The project was generously supported by the Sloan Foundation. The results of the project
will appear in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN AND THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
(Francis X. Diebold et al. eds., Princeton Univ. Press, forthcoming 2009). I am deeply indebted to my
coeditors and the other scholars who participated in this project for increasing my understanding of these
issues.
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The "unknown" (u) refers to a situation in which we can specify an event
but there is considerable uncertainty about when or whether it may occur
because we have a variety of alternative theories without consensus among
experts about which is correct, or because we lack adequate data or sufficiently
powerful statistical techniques to estimate a distribution with even negligible
levels of confidence. The "unknowable" (U) refers to events that we have not
even identified because they have not happened or because we have no widely
accepted theory that leads us to expect that they might happen.
Much of the history of the development of risk management has been
converting U to u to K-although it would be a mistake to infer that we have
enjoyed continuous progress to K. The boundaries are not fixed and behavior is
dynamic. We may find that K has become u and that an entirely new U has
become important. Indeed, Benoit Mandelbrot and Nassim Taleb warn that
there is much more u in K than is commonly acknowledged.2 The past is never
a perfect predictor of the future. New factors may become important, and
relationships estimated in times of normal market functioning tend to break
down at times of market stress. What we thought was mild randomness often
proves to be wild randomness-or at least more often than it should if it were
governed by a Gaussian distribution. In Will Roger's phrase, one of the key
risks may be what we think we know "that just ain't so."
Undue reliance on ratings by a wide variety of financial markets
participants is a good example of this problem in the subprime crisis. Indeed,
much of the current financial crisis has shown us that many things that we
regarded as in the domain of K are in fact in the domain of u. What follows is
an overview of the challenge policymakers face in dealing with a crisis as seen
through the lenses of K, u, and U. I will begin in the next two Parts by
examining the information and incentive problems faced by monetary
policymakers and prudential supervisors in trying to prevent crises. The
concluding Part emphasizes challenges that arise when preventative measures
fail and financial policy makers must manage financial crises.
I. Information Challenges for Financial Policymakers
Financial policy becomes most relevant when a shock that was unknown
or unknowable shifts the financial system from the domain of K into the
domain of u. Financial policymakers are charged with limiting the vulnerability
of the financial system to such shocks and mitigating the consequences of such
shocks once they occur. Financial policymakers aim to promote monetary and
financial stability, but virtually every aspect of financial policymaking is
subject to substantial uncertainty. For example, how precisely should these
objectives be defined? With regard to monetary policy, what amount of
2 Benoit Mandelbrot & Nassim Taleb, Mild and Wild Randomness: Focusing on the Risks that
Really Matter, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN AND THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK
MANAGEMENT, supra note 1.
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inflation is consistent with achieving stable, sustainable growth? What measure
of inflation is appropriate? Is it feasible, both technically and politically, for the
monetary authorities to prevent asset bubbles during periods of low and stable
inflation? 3 Moreover, the monetary authorities must operate with incomplete
knowledge about the current state of the economy and how their actions (or
inaction) may affect economic activity. Monetary policy operates with long and
variable lags and it is difficult to anticipate market responses to shocks. Yet the
monetary authorities must immediately determine whether there is adequate
liquidity in the financial system and whether monetary policy needs to be
adjusted to counter the effects on the economy of a crisis-induced tightening of
credit.4
Prudential supervision generally focuses on safety and soundness issues.
Micro-prudential supervision focuses on the safety and soundness of individual
institutions. By contrast, macro-prudential supervision focuses on the safety
and soundness of the financial system. Although most supervisory resources
are allocated to micro-prudential supervision, the allocation does not ensure
that macro-stability goals will be achieved. Indeed, sometimes the appropriate
action to make an individual institution safer can undermine macro-financial
stability. Demanding that individual institutions hold more capital and reserves
can appear to make those institutions safer, but it may come at the cost of
restricting credit and refusing to roll over loans to other institutions.
With regard to prudential policy, the primary goal of financial stability
must be to protect the functioning of the financial system in providing
payments services and facilitating the efficient allocation of resources over time
and across space. This may be threatened by a loss of confidence in key
financial markets or institutions, as we have seen in the current subprime crisis.
But how safe should financial institutions be? Should all failures be prevented?
Would the consequent, necessary restrictions on risk-taking by financial
institutions reduce the efficiency of financial intermediation and reduce
investment? Would this deprive the economy of the dynamic benefits of
creative destruction? Or would it shift risk-taking and innovation to unregulated
entities where it could not be monitored, much less controlled? What tools
should be used to achieve these objectives?
And what governance structure is most likely to motivate policymakers to
act in the public interest? Public-sector compensation contracts are much more
highly constrained than compensation contracts for senior executives in
financial-services firms. And even where there has been complete freedom of
3 Jacob Frenkel, the former Governor of the Bank of Israel, has expressed doubt about
whether the monetary authorities know enough to deflate bubbles before they become dangerous. John
Thomhill & Adrian Michaels, Bear Stearns Rescue a 'Turning Point,' FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2008, at 4.
Frenkel asserts that the real choice is "Which system do you want: one in which the [monetary
authority] pricks three bubbles out of five or five out of three bubbles? Because we know for sure that it
will not be able to solve four out of four." Id.
4 Donald Kohn, The Role of the Known, the Unknown and the Unknowable in Managing and
Preventing a Crisis: A Central Banker's Perspective, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN AND THE
UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 1.
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contracting in private institutions, we have learned that the outcome may be
dysfunctional, leading risk-takers to accept much more risk than shareholder
principals-or certainly the taxpayers, who have to pay for the consequences of
reckless risk-taking-would want. More fundamentally, when objectives are
not crisply defined, it is difficult to establish and enforce accountability. Blame
avoidance is, by default, the primary objective of most bureaucrats. 5
Although the prudential supervisory authorities have enormous, if ill-
defined, responsibility, they have relatively little power to constrain risk-taking
by profitable institutions that they believe bear excessive exposure to uncertain
shocks. In order to guard against the arbitrary use of regulatory and supervisory
power, most countries subject disciplinary decisions by officials to some sort of
judicial or administrative review. In order to discipline a bank, a supervisor
must not only know that a bank is taking excessive risk, but also be able to
prove it to the satisfaction of the reviewing body-perhaps beyond a reasonable
doubt. This leads to a natural tendency to delay disciplinary measures until
much of the damage from excessive risk-taking has already been done. The
United States has tried to limit the scope for forbearance through prompt
corrective action measures contained in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 19916 by removing a substantial degree of
supervisory discretion. Yet experience during the crisis with IndyMac, an
institution that was permitted to lose nearly nine billion dollars before it was
closed, indicates that even explicit rules may be insufficient to limit
forbearance in times of crisis.
7
Review of supervisory actions also leads officials to react mainly to what
has already happened (and is, therefore, objectively verifiable) rather than to
act on the basis of expectations about what may happen (which are inherently
disputable). Moreover, supervisors are seldom, if ever, held accountable for the
misallocation of resources that occurs when an insolvent institution is permitted
to continue operating.
In Charles Goodhart's refinement of the KuU framework, in which K is
partitioned into actual past data and expected values, supervisors generally
react to past actual losses rather than mean expected losses, much less the
unexpected losses (or standard deviation around the normal distribution) that
are more relevant for setting capital requirements. This pattern persists even
5 For additional discussion of blame avoidance and the challenge of holding bureaucrats
accountable, see Edward Kane, Politics and Fed Policymaking: The More Things Change, the More
They Remain the Same, 6 J. OF MONETARY EcON. 199 (1980). In more recent work, Kane has written:
"These blame-avoidance norms come together in what we might call the First Commandment of
Turmoil Management: Be merciful unto important Home-Country Institutions and lead their problems
not into contagion with other firms or markets." Edward Kane, Incentive Conflict in Central-Bank
Responses to Sectoral Turmoil in Financial Hub Countries (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. WI 3593, 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1029934.
6 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105
Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
7 See Joe Adler, FDIC To Sell IndyMac; But Cost Estimate Grows, AM. BANKER, Jan. 5,
2009, at 4.
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when the mean and standard 'deviations of the distribution are believed to be
known.8 Alan Greenspan, former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, has also expressed doubt about whether regulators
know enough to act preemptively.
9
Information issues present a fundamental challenge to supervisory
authorities who must oversee the solvency of regulated financial institutions.
Neither actual past data nor expected values can be relied upon in times of
crisis when markets become illiquid and difficult supervisory decisions must be
made. Traditionally, bank accounting has been a mix of historical cost
accounting, accrual accounting, and mark-to-market accounting that can
obscure the true financial condition of a bank. This mix of accounting
conventions has sometimes undermined incentives for hedging risks by valuing
a risky position and the offsetting hedge differently, thereby increasing the
volatility of earnings, even though risk has been reduced. Many external
observers doubt this mix of standards conveys a true and fair account of the
current position of a financial institution.10
In an effort to improve and harmonize financial accounting standards
more or less simultaneously during the fall of 2008, the International
Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board
implemented new rules that require firms to fair value their financial assets.
The rules classify these assets in three different categories: (1) assets that can
be marked to market based on prices in active markets for identical
instruments; (2) assets that are marked to matrix, based on observable market
data for similar assets; and (3) assets that are marked to model, based on
judgment regarding how the market would price such assets if they were traded
in active markets. i
This third category presents significant difficulties for regulators, who
face a severe asymmetric information problem vis-A-vis the regulated
institution. How can the regulatory authorities comfortably rely on the
estimated values of "level three" assets?' 2 Yet the question of the correct price
8 C.A.E. Goodhart, Domestic Banking Problems, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN AND THE
UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 1.
9 Alan Greenspan, The Fed Is Blameless on the Property Bubble, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at
9 ("Regulators, to be effective, have to be forward-looking to anticipate the next financial malfunction.
This has not proved feasible. Regulators confronting real time uncertainty have rarely, if ever, been able
to achieve the level of future clarity required to act preemptively.").
10 Ray Ball, Don't Blame the Messenger... or Ignore the Message, Booth School of
Business Initiative on Global Markets (Oct. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.igmchicago.org/2008/10/23/dont-blame-the-messengeror-ignore-the-message/.
11 For additional discussion of fair value standards and the three-tiered classification of assets,
see INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS
AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 54-85 (2008), available at
http://www.imf.org/ExternalVPubs/FT/GFSR/2008/0l/pdf/text.pdf, and Ball, supra note 10.
12 For example, S&P studied one bond, formerly rated AAA, backed by 9000 second
mortgages. Nearly one-quarter are delinquent and losses on those that have defaulted are 40%. One
financial institution carries the bond on its books at 97 cents on the dollar. S&P ran a favorable scenario
and concluded the bond was worth 87 cents on the dollar, but under a less favorable scenario it was
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for such assets is critical for policies like the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) in the United States, as well as for "bad bank" proposals under
consideration in many countries. If the price is set too low, banks will not
willingly participate. If the price is set too high, it can be the source of
enormous concealed taxpayer subsidies. Elizabeth Warren, an independent
monitor appointed by Congress to scrutinize the bank recapitalization program,
has recently stated that the Treasury has overpaid $78 billion in the $254 billion
it has spent in TARP transactions so far.
1 3
Efforts by central banks to add liquidity to the system to revive these
markets have had little effect in the face of persisting concern regarding the
solvency of key counterparties. Indeed, many U.S. banks have chosen to hold
excess reserves at the central bank rather than participate in interbank markets.
The flight to quality has been so extreme on occasion that Treasury bill yields
have turned negative.14
II. Crisis Prevention
Most policymakers would agree with Don Kohn, Vice Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board, that it is better to prevent such crises than to try to
manage and mitigate them once they have occurred. 15 Crisis prevention is an
enormous burden, however, which falls mainly on the shoulders of the
prudential authorities. Prudential regulation attempts to establish rules for the
sound operation of financial institutions and for critical elements of the
financial infrastructure such as clearing and settlement arrangements. Ideally,
prudential policymakers should be looking beyond the known to anticipate
emerging sources of systemic vulnerability in order to calibrate appropriate
prudential policies. In the dynamic world of modem finance, anticipating new
sources of vulnerability requires trying to understand how changing
institutions, products, markets, and trading strategies create vulnerabilities to
new kinds of shocks and new channels of contagion, such as the margin/haircut
spiral and the loss spiral just described. But the known cannot be neglected.
Institutions still fail in familiar ways by taking excessive concentrations of
credit risk or by imprudently borrowing short and lending long, as recent
experience with Northern Rock and dozens of Structured Investment Vehicles
has shown.16
worth only 53 cents on the dollar. It currently trades in the secondary market at 38 cents on the dollar.
See Vikas Bajaj & Stephen Labaton, Big Risks for U.S. in Trying To Value Bad Bank Assets, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, at Al.
13 Krishna Guha, Francesco Guerrera & Julie Macintosh, U.S. Looks at Turning Bank Stakes
to Equity, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at 1.
14 See Michael Mackenzie, Interest Rate on U.S. Treasury Bills Turns Negative, FT.COM,
Dec. 8, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/cOc68a98-c646-1 I dd-a741-000077b07658.html.
15 Id.
16 See INT'L MONETARY FUND, supra note I1, at 54-85 (discussing structured investment
vehicles); see also NORTHERN ROCK PLC, INTERIM RESULTS 6 MONTHS ENDED 30 JUNE 2007 (July
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Prudential supervisory authorities confront a number of trade-offs that
must be made on uncertain terms. How safe should banks be? Goodhart notes
that it is relatively easy to establish a set of penalties that would make the
banking system perfectly safe, but largely irrelevant in intermediating between
savers and investors.' 7 Ken Scott argues that a central feature of corporate
governance is aligning the risk-neutral preferences of well-diversified
shareholders with those of risk-averse managers.18 This calculus is unlikely to
take account of the systemic costs of an institution's failure, and the prudential
authorities will presumably prefer a higher degree of safety. But how much
higher?
By far the most ambitious effort at prudential regulation has been the
development and implementation of the Basel II standards for capital
adequacy.19 These standards try to emulate "economic capital, 2° which is used
by the most sophisticated institutions to measure and aggregate risks. But the
concept is firmly rooted in the world of K. Reliance on economic capital
depends on risk managers (and those who supervise them) being able to
estimate downside tail risks at a high level of confidence so that the financial
institution can establish the amount of capital it needs to protect earnings
volatility at a prescribed level of confidence, to achieve a probability of default
associated with the financial institution's target debt rating.
Banking supervisors from the thirteen countries that comprise the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision began to take note of the evolving concept
of economic capital when they expanded the original Basel Accord on Capital
Adequacy, which set minimum standards of capital adequacy for the member
countries to take account of market risk. The 1996 Market Risk Amendment21
provided an entirely new approach to setting capital requirements that relied on
the way that leading banks were measuring and managing this risk. The
original Accord set capital requirements roughly in line with expected losses.
The concept of economic capital made clear that the role of capital should be to
absorb unexpected losses, with reserves established to absorb expected losses.
And so instead of requiring banks to allocate their positions to crude risk
buckets or applying mechanical asset price haircuts to positions in an attempt to
approximate risks, the regulatory authorities provided the opportunity for
2007), available at http://companyinfo.northernrock.co.uk/downloads/stockExO70725.pdf (showing
Northern Rock's vulnerability to a liquidity crisis).
17 Goodhart, supra note 8.
18 Ken Scott, KUu and the Place of Corporate Governance, in THE KNOWN, THE UNKNOWN
AND THE UNKNOWABLE IN FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT, supra note 1.
19 For background on the efforts of the Basel Committee, see Bank for International
Settlements, Basel 11: Revised International Capital Framework, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm
(last visited Apr. 14, 2009).
20 Economic capital is the amount of capital that a firm needs to ensure that it remains solvent
over a specified period of time with a specified degree of confidence.
21 For additional details, see BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L
SETTLEMENTS, OVERVIEW OF THE AMENDMENT TO THE CAPITAL ACCORD TO INCORPORATE MARKET
RISKS (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs23.htm.
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qualifying banks to rely on the supervised use of their internal models to
determine their capital charges for exposure to market risk.
The "internal models" approach was expected to deliver several benefits.
First, it would reduce or eliminate incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage
because the capital charge would reflect the bank's own estimate of risk.
Second, it would reward diversification to the extent that a bank's internal
models captured correlations across risk positions. Third, it would deal more
flexibly with financial innovations, incorporating them in the regulatory
framework as soon as they were incorporated in the bank's own risk
management models. Fourth, it would provide banks with an incentive to
improve their risk management processes and procedures in order to qualify for
the internal models approach. And fifth, compliance costs would be reduced to
the extent that the business was regulated in the same way that it was managed.
By and large, the "internal models" approach for market risk had proven to be
highly successful, even when it was severely tested by the extreme market
22disruptions in 1997, 1998, and 2001. But it failed spectacularly during the
subprime crisis because of its inability to capture the default risk and associated
liquidity risk in subprime-related instruments.
Nonetheless, this early success, in combination with the progress made in
modeling credit risk, led to calls from industry to revise the original Basel
Accord to incorporate an internal-models approach to capital regulation of
credit risk.23 Basel II attempts to extend this new approach to setting capital
requirements to credit risk and operational risk.24
The architecture of Basel II is built on three pillars. Pillar 1 specifies
capital charges for exposure to credit, market, and operational risk. Pillar 2
describes the Supervisory Review Process. And Pillar 3 sets out standards for
Market Discipline. Although the supervisory authorities were convinced that
credit scoring models had significantly expanded the amount of credit risk that
could be regarded as falling in the domain of the known, they were skeptical
that internal models of credit risk were as reliable and verifiable as models of
market risk. While some kinds of credit risk-like retail lending-have rich
and granular data sets comparable to market risk, other kinds of credit risk are
less amenable to empirical analysis because data are sparse relative to past
credit cycles and distinctly non-granular. In the end, the regulators rejected the
supervised use of internal models, but permitted qualifying banks to use their
internal model inputs-estimates of probability of default, loss given default,
exposure at default, and duration of exposure-as inputs in the regulatory
model that would determine capital requirements. These Pillar 1 capital
requirements recognized the analytical and empirical advances banks had made
22 For an analysis of the Basel process, see Richard J. Herring, Implementing Basel II: Is the
Game Worth the Candle?, in 14 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 267 (2005).
23 Id.
24 See BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEwORK (2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs I28.htm.
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in expanding the extent to which credit risk can be regarded as known.
Unfortunately, the losses experienced by the institutions most heavily engaged
in packaging and selling subprime-related debt have cast considerable doubt on
the reliability of such models. The standardized version of Basel II, which
relies on ratings issued by Nationally Recognized Statistical Ratings
Organizations, has not fared much better. In many cases, more than half the
tranches of subprime-related securities were subjected to triple-notch
downgrades, which are extraordinarily rare in corporate issues.
Because Basel II is an agreement negotiated among the members of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, it reflects a number of political
compromises that undermine its aspirations for technical precision. This is most
evident in the definition of regulatory capital, which is based on accounting
values and includes a number of items that do not reflect an institution's
capacity to bear unexpected losses. This undercuts the link to economic capital
and the logic of the approach.
Pillar 1 capital charges are intended to deal with known risks. Pillar 2, the
Supervisory Review Process, is intended to deal with unknown risks that can be
identified, but are not sufficiently well quantified to establish Pillar 1 capital
charges. Presumably, as theoretical and empirical advances succeed in moving
some of these risks into the domain of K, Pillar 1 capital charges will be
established for them as well.
The principal tools of supervisory analysis in the domain of the unknown
are stress testing and scenario analysis. Stress testing requires economic
judgment to formulate and calibrate scenarios that expose potential
vulnerabilities. It requires a careful consideration of which relationships will
continue to hold and which relationships will break down in time of stress.
Benoit Mandelbrot and Nassim Taleb caution that traditional stress testing,
which relies on selecting a number of worst-case scenarios from past data, may
be seriously misleading because it implicitly assumes that fluctuations of this
magnitude would be the worst that should be expected. 5 They note that crashes
happen without antecedents. Before the crash of 1987, for example, stress
testing would not have included a twenty-two percent drop in share prices
within a single day. In their view, risk managers and prudential supervisors
should evaluate the robustness of a portfolio over an entire spectrum of extreme
risks.
Goodhart emphasizes a different concern regarding stress testing and
scenario analysis. What may matter most in a crisis are interactive effects that
occur when many institutions attempt to adjust their portfolios in the same way
at the same time. These are critical to understanding an institution's
vulnerability in a crisis and the impact on the financial system, but are omitted
from most scenarios.
25 Mandelbrot & Taleb, supra note 2.
26 Goodhart, supra note 8.
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Stress testing and the simulation of crises may be of value even if such
crises never occur. The data necessary to simulate a crisis may prove useful in
monitoring vulnerability, and a careful consideration of the consequences of
such a crisis may lead to changes in strategy and/or risk management. Crises
seldom unfold according to the anticipated scenario, but strategies for
responding to one kind of shock may prove useful when a different kind of
shock occurs. For example, evacuation procedures that Morgan Stanley
established after the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 enabled the
firm to safeguard all of their employees in the much more severe terrorist attack
on September 11, 2001.27
The key element of regulatory discipline under Pillar 2, however, is the
ability of the prudential supervisor to impose an additional capital charge on an
institution if the supervisors are uncomfortable with the results of the
institution's stress tests. This move places supervisors in the role of imposing
discipline on an institution thought to be vulnerable to a shock of unknown
probability. The stance will inevitably prove challenging for supervisors who
are usually much less well-paid and well-informed than bank managers. The
history of bank supervision does not provide much basis for optimism that they
will succeed. In fact, Northern Rock provides a recent example of a notable
failure to do so. In June 2007, just before the near collapse of the bank, the
British Financial Services Authority (FSA) authorized Northern Rock to apply
the Pillar 1 internal-ratings-based risk weights, which reduced its required
regulatory capital by nearly thirty percent. Northern Rock, in turn, planned to
increase its dividends to shareholders by thirty percent. 28 The FSA made no
attempt to offset the reduction in Pillar 1 capital charges with a Pillar 2 capital
charge, nor did it require Northern Rock to conduct a stress scenario that would
have shown that it was fatally exposed to a liquidity shock.
In some cases, it is simply not possible to even imagine the shock that
may occur. How should prudential supervisors deal with this U? As Scott notes,
firms can limit their leverage and maintain enough capital and liquidity to
absorb unknowable losses, should they occur.29 But how much slack is
sufficient? By assumption this quantity is unknowable, and almost all of the
things that banks could do to cope with the unknowable are very costly.
Moreover, competitive pressures may make it very difficult to sustain such
precautions. Should regulators therefore require that banks hold capital
substantially in excess of the regulatory minimum as a safeguard against
unknown and unknowable shocks? Increasing capital charges for risks that
cannot be identified becomes a deadweight cost and may lead to the
27 Seth Schiesel & Riva D. Atlas, By-the-Numbers Operation at Morgan Stanley Finds Its
Human Side, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at B8.
28 See NORTHERN ROCK PLC, supra note 16; see also Press Release, Financial Services
Authority, FSA Moves to Enhance Supervision in Wake of Northern Rock (Mar. 26, 2008), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2008/028.shtml (discussing FSA's assessment
of its failings with regard to the supervision of Northern Rock).
29 Scott, supra note 18.
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circumvention of regulation and riskier outcomes. As Sir Andrew Crockett
observed during a panel discussion at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania, it is inherently difficult for policymakers to strike the proper
balance between the efficiency losses associated with excessively onerous
preventative policies and the cost effectiveness of responding ex post to
adverse events. 30 For regulators as well as firms, the appropriate amount of
financial slack is an unknown.
Pillar 3 of the Basel II approach is intended to enhance market discipline
by improving disclosure. The authorities may collect and publish data that
helps market participants understand the current state of the economy and
financial markets and the condition of regulated financial institutions. But
growing reliance on dynamic trading strategies to manage risk has made it
increasingly difficult to provide a meaningful picture of risk exposures.
Positions may change so rapidly that information is out-of-date before it can be
published. Moreover, the chief motive for market discipline-the fear of loss-
is often undermined by the reluctance of the authorities to permit creditors,
counterparties, and sometimes even shareholders of systemically important
financial institutions to suffer loss. The extraordinary bailouts of Bear Steams,
Citigroup, and Bank of America are recent cases in point. The exception, the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, proved so disruptive that members of the
Group of Seven vowed that such an event should never happen again.
31
The ambitious new Basel II approach attempts to incorporate into capital
regulation what is known about risk management, but it may generate several
unintended consequences that could shift the financial system into the domain
of the unknown. The attempt to force all major firms to adopt one version of
"best practice" and especially the imposition of a regulatory model of credit
risk may increase the likelihood of herding. Banks may be much more likely to
attempt to move in the same direction at the same time, which could undermine
the liquidity of markets and increase volatility.
To the extent that Basel II succeeds in making capital requirements more
risk sensitive, it will make bank lending more pro-cyclical. This tendency is
reinforced by the fact that banks increasingly hold marketable assets that must
be fairly valued. In a boom, measured risks are likely to decline and prices are
likely to rise. Measured capital will rise just as required capital falls, thus
facilitating additional lending and accentuating the boom. In a recession,
intemal ratings will migrate downward, thus increasing required capital. As
institutions attempt to meet rising capital ratios, they may sell assets. If asset
prices fall, this will add to the erosion of the bank's capital position caused by
the downward migration of credit ratings, thus exacerbating the constriction of
the supply of loans. More risk-sensitive capital requirements interacting with a
30 Sir Andrew Duncan Crockett, President, JPMorgan Chase Int'l, Statement at the Wharton
School of the University of Pennsylvania, Panel on Financial Risk Management in Practice: The Known,
the Unknown and the Unknowable (Feb. 23, 2005).
31 Krishna Guha, G7 Pledge 'No More Lehmans,' FT.CoM, Oct. 12, 2008,
http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?newsid=ftol11220081506055760.
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higher proportion of fair valued assets may inadvertently accentuate booms and
busts. This is a clear case where micro-prudential and macro-prudential
objectives may conflict. Basel II may make individual banks safer, but weaken
the banking system. More fundamentally, Basel II fails to deal with systemic
risk.
III. Crisis Management
Because it is so difficult for prudential supervisors to fulfill their
responsibilities ex ante, policymakers must often shift into crisis management
mode to mitigate, ex post, the consequences of a shock. Kohn observes that in a
financial crisis, the ratio of u and U will be especially large relative to K.
32
Policymakers must deal with such unknowns as the size of the future
disruption. How large will it be? How many firms will be involved? How long
will it last? How likely is it to have serious spillover consequences for real
economic activity?
Part of the problem is in anticipating the channels of contagion. Which
firms have direct exposure to the shock? Which firms have indirect exposure
because they are counterparties or creditors of the firms that sustain a direct
impact or because they have similar exposures and could lose access to external
financing? Which other firms might be placed in jeopardy because of the forced
liquidation of assets in illiquid markets as risk-averse lenders and
counterparties demand larger haircuts and/or more collateral for loans? Risk
preferences and perceptions of risk are dynamic, and so a flight to quality often
occurs. Market participants may sell assets whose prices are already declining
and avoid any counterparty that might be impaired. During the subprime crisis,
policymakers have learned that their ability to substitute central bank liquidity
for endogenous liquidity created by the financial system is less effective than
was once believed.
In a crisis, policymakers must try to convert u into K as quickly as
possible. This conversion requires close cooperation across regulatory
authorities within a country and, increasingly, across borders. Inevitably, the
primary source of information is major market participants. But conflicts of
interest may corrupt flows of information. Information may be selectively
communicated to serve the self-interests of market participants who might be
the beneficiaries of crisis management policies. Does this potential distortion of
information argue for a direct role of the crisis manager in supervising
systemically important institutions? The Fed insists that the central bank must
be actively involved in supervising systemically important institutions, but
central banks lack such authority in many other countries,33 and the 2008
Treasury proposal for reforming the U.S. financial system removes supervisory
32 Kohn, supra note 4.
33 Richard J. Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Structure of Cross-Sector Financial
Supervision, 17 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 51 (2008).
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authority from the Fed while increasing its responsibility for crisis
management. 34 How best to organize prudential supervision and crisis
management remains a significant unknown.
Policymakers must also convey information in a crisis. They may urge
firms to do what the policymakers believe they should do in their own self-
interest, as happened in the Long-Term Capital Management crisis in 1998 .
But when is it appropriate to be reassuring and when might reassurances prove
counterproductive?
Crisis management may inadvertently lead to larger future crises. If risk-
takers are protected from the full negative consequences of their decisions, they
may be likely to take greater risks in the future. This presents a difficult
dilemma for crisis management. The costs of inaction are immediate and
obvious. It is easy to imagine damaging outcomes, and self-interested market
participants will press for official support and can easily muster political
support. Inaction in a crisis is likely to be subject to blame even when blame is
not appropriate. Officials' fear of being blamed for inaction may contribute to
an inherent tendency to oversupply public subsidies. Once subsidies have been
provided, entrenched interests will lobby to keep them and new additional
activity may depend on them. Moreover, moral hazard manifests itself slowly
and may be difficult to relate to any one particular policy choice. The history of
crises teaches us that it is very difficult for the authorities to exit from
guarantees issued in a crisis once normal conditions are restored.
Ultimately, efficient resolution policy may be the best safeguard against
moral hazard. But in most countries policymakers lack the appropriate tools to
resolve a large, complex financial institution without jeopardizing the rest of
the financial system. And large complex financial institutions have adopted
corporate structures that defy efficient resolution. The sixteen large complex
financial institutions identified by the International Monetary Fund have two-
and-a-half times as many majority-owned subsidiaries as the sixteen largest37
non-financial corporations. Moreover, most of these firms are managed in an
integrated fashion along lines of business with minimal regard for either
national boundaries or the individual entities which must be taken through
some sort of bankruptcy process in the event of failure. Thus, to prevent the
tendency to oversupply bailouts during crises from leading to greater systemic
risk, the regulatory authorities should devise ways of resolving institutions
34 See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf.
35 See Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, Statement on the Issues Posed by the Near-
Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (Sept. 28, 1998), available at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/20051114_ShadowStatement 151%5B I%5D.pdf
36 Richard J. Herring, International Financial Conglomerates: Implications for Bank
Insolvency Regimes, in MARKET DISCIPLINE IN BANKING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 99 (George G.
Kaufman ed., 2003).
37 Richard J. Herring & Jacopo Carmassi, The Structure of International Financial
Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Systemic Risk, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING
(Allen N. Berger et al. eds., forthcoming 2009).
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without creating intolerable spillovers. The financial authorities can accomplish
more by doing less, if they can credibly restore a role for market discipline in
the system by devising a credible resolution plan for every systemically
important institution.
Devising these plans requires an honest assessment of what we actually
know about the risks assumed by systemically important institutions and,
indeed, what the managers themselves know. Since many of these risks are
unknown and some are unknowable, supervisors need to place much greater
emphasis on increasing the resilience of the system by ensuring that no
institution is too big, too complex, or too interconnected to fail. As a practical
first step, systemically important institutions should be required to file and
update a winding-down plan just as they now file business continuation plans.
If supervisors are not persuaded that the winding down plan is realistic, they
should be empowered to require changes in the size or structure of the firm so
that if an uncertain or unknown shock should occur, the firm could be resolved
without imposing intolerable costs on the rest of the financial system. This is a
much more urgent task for the Basel Committee than adding still more
complexity to Basel II.
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